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Equity between the generations:  
A simple 29-country snapshot 
population aging wide across the oECD has led to a renewed popular 
awareness of the notion of justice between the generations, but also to 
renewed theoretical interest (e.g. fishkin and Goodin, 2010; Gosseries and 
meyer, 2010; Kohli, 2006; sabbagh and Vanhuysse, 2010; 2013). however, 
efforts to measure intergenerational justice empirically have lagged behind 
(but see Esping-andersen and sarasa, 2002; Bradshaw and holmes, 2013). 
how can we improve policies when we do not know the state of affairs 
in terms of intergenerational justice in practice? at the request of the 
Bertelsmann stiftung, i have developed a simple four-dimensional snapshot 
indicator to improve the cognitive toolkit of academics, journalists and 
policy-makers: the Intergenerational Justice Index, or IJI (Vanhuysse, 2013). 
the aim is pragmatic and empirical: to compare intergenerational justice 
in practice across oECD member states (on how empirical indicators 
can inform policy, see e.g. atkinson et al., 2002; lelkes, 2013). the unit of 
analysis is countries, and the IJI is a macro-level snapshot linked primarily 
to government activity rather than private behaviour. the snapshot was 
taken based on the years for which the most complete recent data was 
available for 29 countries: the end of the 2000s or the start of the current 
decade, depending on data availability for each dimension. 
sustainability is the moral starting point: ‘enough and as good’ ought to be 
left by each generation to the next. in aging welfare states, population ag-
ing as a demographic concept may be viewed largely as an ethically neutral 
development for our purposes. a society, or cohorts within it, are not 
morally blamed for lower fertility and longer life expectancy. But the way 
in which a country’s public policy packages react to demographic change 
is not neutral from an intergenerational justice perspective.
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Three policy outcome dimensions;  
one policy input dimension
three of the IJI dimensions measure policy outcomes that leave legacy 
burdens towards younger and future generations: (1) the ecological foot-
print created by all generations alive today; (2) early-life starting condi-
tions as measured by child poverty levels; and (3) the economic and fiscal 
burdens on the shoulders of currently young generations as measured by 
public debt levels per child. austria ranks tenth-worst in the 29-country 
sample on both the ecological footprint measure (on which hungary and 
poland perform best) and the public debt per child measure (on which 
Estonia and south Korea perform best). But on the other hand, austria 
ranks sixth-best in terms of child poverty, just behind the four nordic 
countries and slovenia.
the fourth dimension of IJI develops a new measure of welfare states’ 
overall pro-elderly bias in social spending, or EBiSS (see also lynch, 2006; 
tepe and Vanhuysse, 2010; Gamliel-yehoshua and Vanhuysse, 2010). the 
EBiSS is calculated as follows. on the elderly-oriented spending side (the 
numerator), the following public spending programmes were included: 
(1) old-age-related benefits in cash (pensions, early-retirement pensions, 
other cash benefits) and in kind (residential care/home-help services, 
other benefits in kind), (2) survivors benefits in cash and in kind (funeral 
expenses, other in-kind benefits), (3) disability pensions, (4) occupational 
injury and disease-related pensions, and (5) early retirement for labour 
market reasons. on the non-elderly-oriented side of EBiSS (the denomina-
tor), the following public spending programmes were included: (1) family 
benefits in cash (family allowances, maternity and parental leave, other 
cash benefits) and in kind (day care/home-help services, other in-kind 
benefits), (2) active labour market programmes (employment services 
and administration, labour market training, youth measures, subsidized 
employment, employment measures for the disabled), (3) income mainte-
nance cash benefits, (4) unemployment compensation and severance pay 
cash benefits, and (5) education spending for all levels of education from 
early childhood to university. to adjust for demographic structure (spend-
ing need), the resulting elderly/non-elderly social spending ratio in each 
country has been multiplied by the country’s old-age support ratio, that 
is, the number of persons aged 20–64 over the number of persons aged 
65 or more. 
as figure 1 shows, demography is not destiny when it comes to social 
spending patterns. instead, it is policy choices as determined by long-
standing governance cultures that drive the pro-elderly bias of welfare 
Austria ranks tenth-worst 
on both ecological footprints 
and public debt per child, but 
sixth-best in terms of child 
poverty.
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states (Goerres and Vanhuysse, 2012). of the oECD’s four demographi-
cally oldest societies, italy and japan show a distinct pro-elderly bias in 
their social spending patterns, whereas Germany shows only a moderate 
pro-elderly bias and sweden shows relatively little bias.  
in addition to three south-European countries, East-European countries 
such as slovakia, the Czech republic, slovenia, poland and hungary are 
all in the high-EBiSS spectrum of the 29-country sample, too. legacies 
associated with early post-communist policies such as inadequate health-
care practices, internationally very low labour market participation rates 
among women and older workers and historically unprecedented early 
and disability pensioner booms have prepared these countries badly for 
the coming three decades, when their societies will enter a period of 
particularly fast demographic aging (Vanhuysse, 2004; 2009).
austria also has a relatively high pro-elderly bias: at just over 5.5, it has the 
ninth-highest EBiSS value in the 29-country sample. spending on long-term 
care is actually not particularly high in austria by international comparison 
(rodrigues et al., 2012; leichsenring et al., 2013; schmidt and rodrigues, 
2010). But spending on elderly citizens is otherwise high, especially in all 
forms of pensions and health care. this is not surprising given the high in-
cidence of early labour market exit through early and disability retirement 
(marin, 2013), combined with high and still-rising life expectancy (marin, 
2013) and a low political inclination or ability to reform or even just re-
trench pension spending (tepe and Vanhuysse, 2012). the least pro-elderly 
biased welfare states are south Korea, ireland, new Zealand and Belgium. 
The Austrian welfare state 
has the ninth-highest pro-
elderly bias in the OECD: it 
spends more than five and a 
half times as much on every 
elderly as on every non- 
elderly Austrian.
Figure 1: 
Elderly Bias indicator of social 
spending (EBiSS), 2007-2008
source: 
Vanhuysse (2013: 27)
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the spurious connection between demographic structure and pro-
elderly social policy spending can also be differently illustrated. in the 
demographically still comparatively young poland, the state spent 8.6 
times as much on every elderly pole as on every non-elderly pole in the 
late 2000s. yet in the equally young new Zealand society, the state spent 
only 2.7 times as much. By contrast, in the demographically much older 
Greece, the state spent seven times more for every elderly Greek as it 
spent for every non-elderly Greek. But in comparably old sweden, the 
state spent only 3.4 times more.
The Intergenerational Justice Index 
the four IJI dimensions are then normalized1 and aggregated into an 
overall IJI value, using a ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ weighting method to re-
spect the (revealed) preferences of democratically elected governments. 
among the most intergenerationally just oECD countries were Estonia, 
south Korea, new Zealand and all of nordic Europe. By contrast, among 
the least intergenerationally just countries were the usa, japan, italy, 
Greece and Canada (Vanhuysse, 2013: 37). 
austria is situated in the lower-middle pack of the sample, at twentieth-
highest (or tenth-worst) rank. this can be illustrated through the IJI 
rectangle for austria in figure 2 where the four IJI dimensions have been 
normalized such that a better relative performance is associated with 
a higher value (maximum value 1). austria, with its comparatively large 
ecological footprint and its strongly pro-elderly biased welfare state, 
features a rather small and rather rectangular shape for the IJI rectangle. 
as regards ecology, austria is one of the few Eu countries that have failed 
(and significantly so) to meet the goals of the Kyoto agreement. As re-
gards demographic structure, austria’s old-age dependency ratio (persons 
aged 65+ relative to persons aged 15-64), currently at about 27%, is set 
to increase further to 39% by 2030 (Gasior et al., 2011; see also marin, 
2013). Despite some recent reforms in disability pensions and early 
1 to normalize the four IJI dimensions (ecological footprint, child poverty, debt per child 
and EBiSS), for each country i and each dimension x the difference is taken between 
the maximum performance in the entire oECD sample (x
max
) and the actual perfor-
mance of country i (x
i
). this difference is then divided by the difference between the 
maximum (x
max
) and minimum (x
min
) performance in the 29-country set. the normal-
ized values x
ni
 can thus be expressed as:
x
ni
 = (x
max
 - x
i
) / (x
max
 - x
min
)
 in other words, the denominator is given by the difference between the maximum 
value and the minimum value in the oECD country set. the numerator is given by the 
difference between the maximum sample value and the value achieved by the country 
under consideration. this implies that a better relative performance is associated with 
a higher value, with each x
ni
 value varying between 0 and 1 (Vanhuysse, 2013).
 
Austria is at twentieth rank 
out of 29 OECD countries in 
terms of the Intergenera-
tional Justice Index.
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retirement arrangements, the austrian pension system is not ready to 
cope with such challenges, and younger generations will not be entitled 
to equally generous pensions as their parents unless significant labour 
market activation policies are implemented (marin, 2013). today, austrians 
still record very low effective retirement ages, at 59 years for men and 58 
for women, and concomitantly low employment rates for older workers 
(Gasior et al., 2011; marin, 2013). 
Conclusions and policy options
more research needs to be done, ideally involving time series data and 
cohort analysis, to enrich the snapshot analysis presented here. But it 
seems plausible to state that unless low-IJI countries such as the usa, 
japan, italy, Greece and Canada can somehow guarantee fast economic 
and productivity growth and rapid technological innovation in the near 
future, not reforming current policy patterns would simply mean that a 
high degree of injustice will be inflicted upon non-elderly citizens. Stick-
ing to the status quo would perpetuate a bad deal for young and future 
generations in these countries.
seemingly ‘obvious’ policy measures that merit a new look in light of 
the IJI perspective include fiscal and social security benefits or credits to 
reward family members for raising younger and caring for elderly gen-
Figure 2: 
the IJI rectangle: Austria
source: 
author’s computations
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erations (often expending substantial private cost for societal benefit); 
the adjustment of official pension ages and pension benefits to rising life 
expectancy (e.g. marin, 2013); and ecologically motivated tax frameworks 
such as carbon taxes (e.g. muro and rothwell, 2012). there is a particu-
larly strong case for spending more on high-quality early childhood edu-
cation and similar social investment policies that increase human capital 
and skills and bolster the fiscal basis of aging welfare states in the process 
(heckman, 2000; Doyle et al., 2009; Esping-andersen, 2008; morel et al., 
2012; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011; Vanhuysse, 2008). 
But the hard power politics of population aging matters crucially, too 
(Vanhuysse and Goerres, 2012). When ‘obviously’ sound policies are not 
sufficiently implemented, wishfully thinking such policies into existence is 
not likely to be an effective strategy. Children are also public goods  
(Coleman, 1993; Folbre, 1994) and they need to be valued as such by 
public policies in rapidly aging welfare states. the time is ripe for at least 
opening a clear-headed and empirically informed democratic debate 
about the radical idea of giving each parent one half extra vote, to be 
used on behalf of each under-age child until that child reaches legal voting 
age. these proxy votes for children, or Demeny votes (Demeny, 1986; 
sanderson and scherbov, 2007), could be made conditional on parents 
guaranteeing minimum child welfare, and they could otherwise be regu-
lated according to a host of civic requirements deemed democratically 
desirable. proxy votes would add bite to the policy claims of younger 
generations in aging societies as they would change the incentive struc-
ture of elected policy-makers. 
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